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The Impact of Agri-Environmental Policies
and Production Intensification on the
Environmental Performance of Dutch Dairy Farms
Ioannis Skevas, Xueqin Zhu, Victoria Shestalova, and Grigorios Emvalomatis
This study examines the impact of policies and intensification on the environmental performance
of Dutch dairy farms in the period 2001–2010 using a hyperbolic distance function. The
results indicate that the change from the Mineral Accounting System to the combination of
the Application Standards Policy with decoupled payments has not significantly changed farms’
hyperbolic efficiency. Farms receiving agri-environmental and animal welfare payments are less
hyperbolically efficient than those that do not, highlighting greater decreases in desirable outputs
than decreases in undesirable outputs. Finally, intensification increases hyperbolic efficiency,
suggesting that intensive practices may increase production without harming the environment.
Key words: hyperbolic efficiency, policy evaluation, subsidies
Introduction
A long-lasting trend that characterizes dairy farming in Europe is the adoption of increasingly
intensive agricultural practices. This intensification of the production process is manifested in
observable data in two major ways (Caviglia-Harris, 2005): growing numbers of dairy cows per
unit of land and increasing quantities of variable inputs, particularly feed concentrates, per animal.
If the decision to adopt such production techniques is based on purely economic criteria, then it
is expected that intensive production techniques could result in lower average costs. On the other
hand, intensification has been associated with negative impacts on the environment. Specifically,
the amounts of nutrients, such as phosphorus (P) and particularly nitrogen (N), imported into the
production system in the form of dairy feed and fertilizers are typically greater than those exported
in the form of milk products and those absorbed by crops that leave the farm, with the difference
between the two leaching to the environment.
To abate the negative impact of intensive agricultural practices on the environment, policy
makers in most European countries have implemented policies specifically aimed at reducing the
amount of nutrient leaching. These policies usually set incentives that either partially internalize
the negative externalities of nutrient leaching or provide rewards for reduced leaching and the
application of environmentally friendly production techniques. Since changes in policies and
intensification impact the production of both desirable outputs (i.e., cows’ milk) and undesirable
outputs (i.e., nitrogen surplus), evaluating the relationship between policy and farms’ ability to
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maximize desirable outputs and minimize undesirable outputs is important for future policy design.
Therefore, there is a need to use integral measures, which account for both the aforementioned
production aspects, in policy evaluations.
The Dutch dairy sector is characterized as an intensive farming sector, which has experienced
various agri-environmental policies in recent years. This paper illustrates how Dutch dairy farms’
performance, in terms of their ability to maximize desirable and minimize undesirable outputs, can
be empirically computed using an integral measure. We aim to provide some insights into how those
agri-environmental policies influence their performance. Given that the policies ruling EU farms
are targeted toward reducing the production of undesirable outputs, the purpose of this study is
to compute an integral measure that evaluates not only the success of these policies in minimizing
undesirable outputs but also the way in which the production of desirable outputs is affected, because
minimizing undesirable outputs may come at a cost of reducing desirable outputs.
Reviewing the recent methodological literature on efficiency measurement, we select a suitable
methodology for an integral efficiency measurement. The measure considers farms’ ability to
maximize desirable outputs and minimize undesirable outputs, allowing us to account for a complex
decision-making environment. Following Cuesta, Lovell, and Zofío (2009), who first used this
measure in a parametric setting, we evaluate the impact of intensification and agri-environmental
policies on the efficiency of Dutch dairy farms using the hyperbolic efficiency measure. One
component considers maximizing desirable outputs, while the other component involves minimizing
total nutrient surplus, providing a more general approach compared to the materials balance
approach used by Coelli, Lauwers, and Van Huylenbroeck (2007) and Murty, Russell, and Levkoff
(2012) in the sense that nutrients in outputs are not considered to be fixed.
We apply this well-established methodology to the case of Dutch dairy farms. The joint
efficiency measure we use is more flexible than that used by Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijssen (1999)
and Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijssen (2002), who measured either only farms’ ability to minimize
nutrient surplus (given desirable output) or only their ability to maximize their desirable outputs
(given nutrient surplus). However, considering a joint measure can provide further information
on potential (simultaneous) changes in the production of undesirable and desirable outputs.
Furthermore, we use a more recent dataset that covers two important policy changes: i) the transition
period from the Mineral Accounting System (MINAS) to the Application Standards Policy (ASP)
and ii) the introduction of the optional agri-environmental and animal welfare payments. The
former is considered to be one of the main reshaping features of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), while previous research on the latter has merely addressed the issue of the determinants
of participation in such agri-environmental schemes without examining their impact on efficiency.
Using a parametric specification allows us to identify the drivers of hyperbolic inefficiency in a one-
step procedure. Given that the policies that have influenced the Dutch dairy sector not only reduced
nitrogen surpluses but may also have affected the production of desirable outputs, the joint efficiency
measure enables us to identify the effect of the policies on both production aspects.
The empirical findings confirm that policy-induced decreases in nitrogen surpluses are
accompanied by simultaneous losses in the production of desirable outputs. This is because the
effect of policies on the joint efficiency measure used is not positive. Such a finding highlights the
advantage of using a joint efficiency measure when examining the relationship between policies and
efficiency, as previous studies that examined the impact of policies on a single efficiency measure
did not reveal changes in all production aspects.
Background and Related Work
In the Netherlands, the issue of nutrient leaching is of high importance due to the large share of
dairy farming in total agricultural production and the special topology of the country (Oenema et al.,
2011). The Netherlands was among the first EU member states to regulate nutrient leaching. In 1998,
MINAS came into force in the Netherlands, aiming to achieve stabilization of manure production by
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Figure 1. Nitrogen Surplus per Hectare for Dutch Dairy Farms, 2001–2010
reducing mineral surpluses. MINAS used a farm-gate-balance approach, measuring the N and P that
entered and left the farm. Nutrient surplus was determined as the difference between the nutrients
found in the inputs and in the outputs of the production process. This way of measuring nutrient
leaching is known as the materials balance principle. Maximum permissible levels of surpluses
were set and exceeding these levels resulted in payments of levies: 2.3 euro/kg for N and 9 euro/kg
for P (Neeteson, 2000). However, the EU Court of Justice ruled that MINAS did not comply with
the EU Nitrates Directive as it did not include application standards for nutrients.1 Hence, the ASP
came into force in 2006, setting application standards for N and P.2 In contrast to MINAS, sanctions
resulting from exceeding these standards took the form of fines and criminal justice (Berentsen,
2005).
The Dutch dairy sector was also influenced by several EU agri-environmental policies, such
as agri-environmental and animal welfare payments and decoupled payments. Agri-environmental
and animal welfare payments constitute an optional measure for farmers that encourage them to
protect and enhance the environment on their farmland. Farmers who receive such payments are
required to carry out agri-environmental commitments that involve more than the adoption of typical
good farming practices. More specifically, farmers commit to adopting environmentally friendly
farming techniques for at least 5 years and, in return, receive payments that provide compensation for
applying these techniques. Examples of such techniques are reductions in fertilizers, pesticides, and
stock density; appropriate soil management; and use of buffer strips. (Gailhard and Bojnec, 2015).
Decoupled payments, introduced in 2006, oblige farmers to maintain their land in good agricultural
and environmental condition and respect application standards for nutrients in order to receive their
payments (Ciaian, Kancs, and Swinnen, 2014).
The above-mentioned policy instruments are expected to reduce the production of dairy farms’
undesirable outputs by introducing incentives for responsible environmental practices. Indeed, based
on the dataset used in the application that follows, Dutch dairy farms’ nitrogen surpluses have
sharply decreased since 2006, coincident with the period after ASP and decoupled payments were
introduced. This is evident from Figure 1. However, farms may have achieved this decrease in
nitrogen surpluses by diverting resources away from producing desirable outputs.
Several studies have examined the impact of these policies on farms’ ability to maximize
desirable outputs. Zhu and Oude Lansink (2010) and Zhu, Demeter, and Oude Lansink (2012)
concluded that decoupled payments are negatively related to farms’ ability to maximize desirable
outputs, attributing this effect to a possible reduction in farmers’ motivation. However, when it
1 The EU Nitrates Directive was introduced in 1991 and forced EU member states to lower the nitrate load from agriculture
to groundwater and surface waters. From 2002 onward, member states were also obliged to guarantee that applications of N
from animal manure did not exceed 170 kg/ha per year.
2 ASP set a standard for the application of N from animal manure of 170 kg/ha, as required by the EU Nitrates Directive,
and a standard depending on soil type and crop for the application of mineral N and P from fertilizer and manure.
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comes to the optional agri-environmental measures, empirical applications have merely focused
on examining farmers’ willingness to adapt to such measures and the determinants of their
participation (Vanslembrouck, van Huylenbroeck, and Verbeke, 2002; Hynes and Garvey, 2009;
Ma et al., 2012). Farmers who adopt intensive agricultural practices are less willing to participate in
these agri-environmental measures, while less productive farms tend to report higher participation
(Zimmermann and Britz, 2016).
Some studies have attempted to shed light on the impact of intensification on farms’ ability
to minimize nutrient surplus. Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijssen (1999) defined intensification as the
ratio of milk production per hectare of land and found intensive farms to be more efficient in
minimizing their nutrient surplus compared to extensive farms. According to Reinhard, Lovell, and
Thijssen (1999), intensive Dutch dairy farms typically buy feed instead of producing it. Hence, the
total nutrient surplus of farms that purchase feed is lower compared to those that produce it, since
producing roughage on the farm requires applying fertilizers and manure and more nutrients are
therefore imported into the system. Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijssen (2002) captured intensification
as feed intake per cow, which they found to be negatively related to efficiency.
When it comes to agri-environmental policy evaluation, earlier empirical studies have focused
on examining either farms’ ability to maximize desirable outputs or to minimize undesirable
outputs separately. Measuring the former by taking an output-expanding approach is straightforward.
Measuring the latter has undergone several developments, with the most recent making explicit use
of the materials balance condition. Based on the definition of the materials balance condition, Coelli,
Lauwers, and Van Huylenbroeck (2007) and Murty, Russell, and Levkoff (2012) define efficiency
as the ratio of minimum nutrients in inputs to observed nutrients in inputs, given the nutrients found
in outputs, and measure efficiency in a nonparametric framework using data envelopment analysis
(DEA). Hoang and Nguyen (2013) and Guesmi and Serra (2015) use the same approach to measure
efficiency in a DEA framework and use a second-stage Tobit model to explain variation in farm
efficiency. Nevertheless, it is apparent that national and EU policies may impact both farms’ ability
to maximize desirable outputs and minimize undesirable outputs. To assess the integral impact of
such policies, it is necessary to measure a farm’s ability to efficiently produce desirable outputs,
given the inputs used with the minimal detrimental effect on the environment.
Integral measures of efficiency have been predominantly proposed in nonparametric settings
using DEA (Färe et al., 1989; Färe, Grosskopf, and Zaim, 2002). Nevertheless, identifying the
determinants of inefficiency can be computationally demanding when nonparametric techniques
are considered. Bootstrap techniques and second-stage models are required to correct for serial
correlation of the nonparametric efficiency estimates and identify the impact of environmental
variables on inefficiency (Simar and Wilson, 2007).
In a parametric framework, Cuesta and Zofío (2005) and Cuesta, Lovell, and Zofío (2009)
implemented the parametric counterpart of the hyperbolic efficiency measure introduced by Färe
et al. (1989). Furthermore, Glass et al. (2014) incorporated inefficiency determinants to explain
variability in hyperbolic efficiency scores, while Mamardashvili, Emvalomatis, and Jan (2016) used
the hyperbolic efficiency measure to derive shadow prices for undesirable outputs.3 This measure
considers the possibility of both the expansion of desirable outputs and the contraction of undesirable
outputs simultaneously, holding inputs fixed. Hyperbolic efficiency can, therefore, serve to measure
farms’ joint performance. Moreover, using a parametric setting facilitates examining inefficiency
determinants, including polices.
3 Shadow prices for nitrogen surplus were also derived in a recent study by Malikov, Bokusheva, and Kumbhakar (2018),
who used a hedonic output-based index approach.
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Modeling Approach
Theoretical Background
Efficiency measurement has been the subject of several studies. Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA),
introduced by Aigner, Lovel, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977),
constitutes the most popular parametric technique for measuring efficiency. Depending on the
orientation toward which efficiency is measured, the farm-specific efficiency score reflects the ability
of the farm to minimize input use when producing a given output vector or to maximize output
production given the inputs used (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). These SFA models assume a
composed error structure in which the first error component captures purely statistical noise and
the second nonnegative error component captures inefficiency.
Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1985) modified the efficiency measure to allow for
equiproportionate contraction of the input vector and expansion of the output vector simultaneously,
introducing the notion of hyperbolic efficiency. The need to distinguish between desirable and
undesirable outputs when evaluating producers’ performance led Färe et al. (1989) to account for
the contraction of undesirable outputs instead of inputs.4 In the latter case, hyperbolic efficiency,
enhanced for the production of undesirable outputs, reflects the farm’s ability to expand desirable
outputs and contract undesirable outputs, in equal proportions, without altering the quantity of
inputs (Färe et al., 1989). In a parametric setting, two alternative approaches have been proposed
in the literature that account for equiproportionate expansion of desirable outputs and contraction of
undesirable outputs.
One alternative approach is the directional distance function, which gives inefficient farms a
preassigned direction to reach the production frontier through a straight line.5 Equiproportionality
is achieved by choosing the direction that is proportional to the observed desirable and undesirable
outputs (Färe et al., 2005). However, a weakness of the directional distance function is that the
efficiency measure does not satisfy the very crucial property of commensurability (Peyrache and
Coelli, 2009).6
The second alternative, the hyperbolic distance function, accounts for equiproportionate
expansion of desirable outputs and contraction of undesirable outputs, where inefficient farms move
along a hyperbolic path to reach the production frontier. Figure 2 illustrates such a hyperbolic path
toward the frontier in the case of a single desirable output (y) and a single undesirable output (b).
Consider a farm that is currently operating at point A. If the farm seeks to expand only y while
keeping b fixed, it will move to point C. However, if the farm aims to contract b while keeping
y fixed, it will move to point B. Finally, in the case of hyperbolic efficiency, the farm seeks to
equiproportionately expand y and contract b, moving hyperbolically toward point D.
Now suppose that a new policy requires the farm operating at point A to reduce undesirable
outputs from b′ to b′′. Adjusting the production of undesirable outputs in the short run may force
the farm to move to point E. At this point, the farm will be more efficient in producing undesirable
outputs, less efficient in producing desirable outputs, but more hyperbolically efficient since it will
move to a point that is closer to the frontier. This hypothetical example suggests that movements of a
farm responding to policy changes are unlikely to occur in a straight horizontal or vertical direction;
efficiency changes are therefore better captured by a joint measure.
A hyperbolic distance function can be used to measure farms’ hyperbolic efficiency in the
case where input vectors, x ∈ RQ+, can produce desirable output vectors, y ∈ RK+, and undesirable
output vectors, b ∈ RM+ . Following Cuesta, Lovell, and Zofío (2009), the hyperbolic distance
4 Ball et al. (2004) followed this procedure and used water contamination as an indicator of undesirable outputs.
5 O’Donnell (2010) and subsequent work by Tozer and Villano (2013) relaxed the assumption of a preassigned direction
toward the frontier.
6 Commensurability refers to the scale invariance property. If this property is not satisfied, the efficiency measure depends
on the units of measurement of the variables that enter the model.
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Figure 2. Hyperbolic Path of an Inefficient Farm toward the Frontier
function represents the maximum expansion of the desirable output vector and the equiproportionate
contraction of the undesirable output vector so that producers reach the boundary of the production
possibilities set, T , given the amount of inputs used:
(1) DH(x,y,b) = min
{
θ > 0 :
(
x,
y
θ
,b θ
)
∈ T
}
,
where θ is a scalar. The hyperbolic distance function has a value range between 0 and 1 and can
be used directly as a measure of efficiency: When θ = 1, then the combination (x,y,b) is on the
boundary of the production possibilities set and, thus, represents a hyperbolically efficiency point.
When θ < 1, the point (x,y,b) is in the interior of the production possibilities set and is associated
with hyperbolic efficiency equal to θ . Using the almost homogeneity condition7 and choosing the
Kth desirable outputs for normalization purposes we have
(2) DH
(
x,
y
yK
,b yK
)
=
DH(x,y,b)
yK
.
Technically, the hyperbolic distance function is almost homogeneous of degrees 0, 1, −1, 1,
nondecreasing in desirable outputs and nonincreasing in undesirable outputs and inputs. Unlike
the directional distance function, Cuesta, Lovell, and Zofío’s (2009) hyperbolic distance function
satisfies the property of commensurability. In this study, we rely on the hyperbolic distance function
to derive an efficiency measure that does not depend on the units of measurement of inputs and
outputs, thus strengthening the reliability of efficiency score estimates.
Empirical Model
An estimable form of the distance function is obtained from equation (2) by replacing DH(x,y,b)
with HE (i.e., hyperbolic efficiency), taking logs on both sides, rearranging, and appending an error
term, v, that captures statistical noise to the righthand side of the equation:
(3) − logyK = logDH
(
x,
y
yK
,b yK
)
+ v− logHE
7 A function f (x,y,b) is almost homogeneous of degrees λ1, λ2, λ3, and λ4 if f
(
µλ1 x,µλ2 y,µλ3 b
)
= µλ4 f (x,y,b) ∀ µ >
0.
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Parametrically, the hyperbolic distance function is specified as translog in inputs, desirable and
undesirable outputs, and time, leading to
− logyKit = α0 +
Q
∑
q=1
αq logxqit +
1
2
Q
∑
q=1
Q
∑
r=1
αqr logxqit logx
r
it
+
K−1
∑
k=1
βk log
[
ykit
]∗
+
1
2
K−1
∑
k=1
K−1
∑
l=1
βkl log
[
ykit
]∗
log
[
ylit
]∗
+
M
∑
m=1
δm log
[
bmit
]∗
+
1
2
M
∑
m=1
M
∑
n=1
δmn log
[
bmit
]∗
log
[
bnit
]∗
(4)
+
Q
∑
q=1
M
∑
m=1
piqm logxqit log
[
bmit
]∗
+
Q
∑
q=1
K−1
∑
k=1
ρqk logx
q
it log
[
ykit
]∗
+
M
∑
m=1
K−1
∑
k=1
τmk log
[
bmit
]∗
log
[
ykit
]∗
+ ζtt + ζttt2 +
Q
∑
q=1
φqt logxqit
+
M
∑
m=1
ψmt log
[
bmit
]∗
+
K−1
∑
k=1
ωkt log
[
ykit
]∗
+ vit + uit ,
where uit ≡− logHEit ;
[
ykit
]∗
=
ykit
yKit
; [bmit ]
∗ = bmit · yKit ; q= 1, . . . ,Q indexes inputs; k = 1, . . . ,K
indexes desirable outputs; m= 1, . . . ,M indexes undesirable outputs, subscript i represents
individuals, and t is a time trend that increases by 1 between successive years (i.e., from 0 in 2001
up to 9 in 2010).
The composite error term, vit + uit , has a positive skewness. This is because the dependent
variable has a negative sign. The two error components are assumed to follow the following
distributions: vit ∼N (0,σ2v ) and uit follows a normal distribution truncated from below at 0,
uit ∼N +(z′itξ ,σ2u ). Hence, following the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach of inefficiency
determinants, the location parameter of the inefficiency component, uit , is specified as a function of
explanatory variables, including farm-specific characteristics and policy variables z′it and associated
parameters ξ .8 We estimate the model in equation (4) using maximum-likelihood techniques, which
allow us to obtain the conditional distribution of the inefficiency component, E[uit |εit ], where
εit = vit + uit . The hyperbolic efficiency of farm i in year t is calculated as
(5) HEit = exp [logDH(x,y,b)] = exp(−uit).
Data
The data used for this application were provided by the Agricultural Economics Research Institute
of the Netherlands (LEI). LEI, along with the Centre for Economic Information of the Netherlands
(CEI), carry out the task of bookkeeping data for Dutch farms in order to comply with the
requirements of the EU Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). The accounting data that FADN
provides are collected regionally using a common questionnaire across all member states. The
dataset contains farm-level economic and financial data (revenues from outputs, expenses on inputs,
subsidies, etc.) required by FADN; for national policy purposes, data on nutrient surpluses are also
8 We also consider a model in which the variables in z affect the variance of the inefficiency component and a model in
which the z variables affect both the variance of inefficiency and the variance of the two-sided error term, vit , as in Kumbhakar
and Lovell (2003). However, in the application that follows, the results are qualitatively the same, while the employed model
is favored by the data when compared to these two alternative models, based on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
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available. FADN uses stratified random sampling, in which farms remain in the panel for 4–5 years
on average, although there are cases where farms remain for more than 10 years. The dataset used
here contains information on conventional Dutch dairy farms from 2001 to 2010. This study focuses
on farms engaged primarily in dairy production. We therefore selected farms for which revenues
from sales of cow’s milk, beef, and veal account for at least 80% of their total revenues for every
year in which they are observed. Our final dataset is an unbalanced panel with 2,105 observations.
Two desirable outputs are used in the translog specification of the hyperbolic distance function:
deflated revenues from sales of cow’s milk and milk-related products (milk), and deflated revenues
and change in value of beef and veal, plus deflated revenues from sales of arable products, plants,
flowers, vegetables, and horticultural products (other output). Five inputs are used in the translog
specification: deflated value of capital, including buildings and machinery (K); labor, consisting of
hired and family labor (L); land after aggregation of the owned and rented land (A); deflated value
of variable inputs, consisting of expenditures on fertilizers, pesticides, purchased feed and energy
(I); and livestock units (S). Finally, N surplus, calculated as the difference between the nitrogen
contained in the inputs and the nitrogen contained in the outputs, is specified as an undesirable
output. Figure 1 in Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijssen (1999) illustrates how nitrogen in inputs and
outputs is calculated for Dutch dairy farms. The above-mentioned revenues and values are deflated
using price indices obtained from EUROSTAT, using 2005 as the base year.
While the model can in principle cope with multiple undesirable outputs, the empirical analysis
focuses on one undesirable output, N surplus. P surplus has been dropped from the model because
13.53% of observations had negative P surpluses. According to Keyzer (2010), P, in contrast to N,
accumulates in the soil, whereas N can be evaporated and washed out by water. This fact provides
a potential explanation for observing so many negative values for P surpluses. Following the same
reasoning, since N can be easily washed out from the system, farmers apply N intensively on purpose
in order to maintain desirable N levels on their farms; N surplus can therefore be a more important
factor in explaining efficiency than P surplus.9 Prior to estimation, the data for outputs and inputs are
normalized by their geometric means, which enables us to interpret the model’s parameter estimates
associated with the first-order terms as distance function elasticities, evaluated at the mean of the
data. We also transformed the time trend variable prior to estimation in deviations from its mean,
in order to enable us to interpret the coefficient associated with this variable as minus the rate of
productivity growth due to technical progress, evaluated at the mean of the data.10
The explanatory variables, zit , affecting the inefficiency term, uit , in equation (4) include two
policy variables, an intensification indicator, a farm-specific control factor, and a time trend. First,
since the main policy change in the period 2001–2010 consisted of the switch from MINAS to
the combination of ASP with decoupled payments in 2006, we include a dummy variable (ASP-
decoupled), which takes a value of 0 for the period 2001–2005 and 1 afterward. This dummy variable
aims to capture differences in the hyperbolic efficiency scores before and after the introduction of
ASP and decoupled payments. Additionally, a second dummy variable (payments) is specified to
account for potential differences in the hyperbolic efficiency of farms that receive agri-environmental
and animal welfare payments and those that do not.11 The “payments” dummy takes a value of 1
for all t if farmers received agri-environmental and animal welfare payments in any year t and
0 otherwise. Both policies (ASP-decoupled payments and agri-environmental and animal welfare
payments) introduce incentives to farms to reduce their nutrient surpluses, which is evident from
Figure 1. Hence, one would expect that after 2006 (the time period that ASP with decoupled
9 Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijssen (2000) also disregarded P surplus from their analysis as the monotonicity assumption for
P surplus was violated for more than half of their observations.
10 For instance, the derivative of the hyperbolic distance function with respect to an input q at the geometric mean of the
data is ∂ logDH∂xq = αq + 2αqq(logx
q) + ∑Qr=1αqr(logxr) + ∑
M
m=1 piqm(logbm) + ∑
K
k=1 ρqk(logyk) + φqt¯ = αq because (due to
the mean normalization) evaluation of the derivative at the mean of the data implies that logxq, logxr , logbm, logyk , and
t¯ = 0.
11 In the dataset, 34.8% of farms received agri-environmental and animal welfare payments.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of the Model’s Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Milk (1,000e) 208.59 139.35
Other (1,000e) 24.69 22.14
Capital (1,000e) 161.88 110.99
Labor (1,000 man-hours) 3.10 1.35
Land (hectares) 56.04 34.35
Variable inputs (1,000e) 51.60 35.16
Livestock (livestock units) 153.57 93.98
Nitrogen surplus (1,000kg) 9.11 6.74
ASP-decoupled (dummy) 0.52 0.50
Payments (dummy) 0.35 0.48
Intensity (feed/livestock)/1000 0.30 0.10
Milk share (milk revenues/total revenues, %) 89.89 5.14
Trend (0–9) 4.67 2.89
Notes: Prior to estimation, all inputs and outputs are normalized by their geometric mean and the trend variable by its
arithmetic mean.
payments came into force) farms would succeed in reducing their undesirable outputs compared
to the period before, while farms receiving agri-environmental and animal welfare payments would
be also doing better in terms of minimizing their undesirable outputs. However, reducing nutrient
surpluses may affect the production of desirable outputs. Hence, our study evaluates the net effect
of these policies on the joint efficiency measure. Finally, note that we allow the aforementioned
payments to affect efficiency only and not output through the distance function. While a few studies
in the literature, including Zhengfei and Oude Lansink (2006) and McCloud and Kumbhakar (2008),
have allowed subsidies to directly affect output, we follow the typical approach of allowing subsidies
to impact farms’ efficiency levels because a technical relationship between output and subsidies
does not exist. Since subsidies can relax farms’ liquidity constraints and, therefore, their input use,
controlling for input use is adequate to describe the relationship between outputs and inputs.
Purchased feed per livestock units (intensity) is used as an indicator of intensification, since, as
mentioned in the introduction, dairy sector intensification is characterized by the increasing use of
feed concentrates per animal. The share of revenues from milk production in total revenues (milk
share) is included to capture the effect of specialization in milk production on hyperbolic efficiency.
Finally, the time trend aims to capture changes in farms’ hyperbolic inefficiency over time and
takes values from 0 (for 2001) to 9 (for 2010). Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables
included in the analysis.
Results
Appendix Table A1 presents the complete set of estimation results for equations (4) and (5). Table 2
reports the parameter estimates of the first-order terms of the hyperbolic distance function. The left-
side variable logyKit in equation (4) is negative. Therefore, and by visualizing Figure 2, the signs
of the distance elasticities should have the following properties: i) for a given input vector x and
undesirable output vector b, an increase in outputs will bring the observation closer to the frontier.
This means that the minimum possible contraction (θ) of the new output vector in equation (1) is
larger. Therefore, the distance elasticity with respect to other output is expected to be positive. ii)
For a given output vector y and input vector x, an increase in undesirable outputs will move the
observation to the right, and therefore further away from the frontier. This implies that the minimum
possible contraction (θ) of the new output vector in equation (1) is smaller. Hence, the distance
elasticity with respect to undesirable outputs is expected to be negative. Finally, iii) when an input
increases ceteris paribus, the boundary of the production possibilities set moves upward. Therefore,
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates of the First-Order Terms of the Hyperbolic Distance Function
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. p-Value
log_other 0.027∗∗∗ 0.009 0.004
log_K −0.023∗∗∗ 0.008 0.002
log_L −0.023∗∗ 0.011 0.032
log_A −0.078∗∗∗ 0.013 0.000
log_I −0.379∗∗∗ 0.018 0.000
log_S −0.385∗∗∗ 0.021 0.000
log_N −0.069∗∗∗ 0.007 0.000
Trend −0.019∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000
Notes: other refers to other outputs, K to capital, L to labor, A to land, I to variable inputs, S to livestock units, and N to
nitrogen surplus. Double and triple asterisks (**, ***) indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 5%
and 1% significance level, respectively.
Table 3. Parameter Estimates of Determinants of Hyperbolic Inefficiency
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. p-Value
ASP-decoupled −0.011 0.039 0.779
Payments 0.055∗∗ 0.024 0.020
Intensity −0.875∗∗∗ 0.234 0.000
Milk share −0.031∗∗∗ 0.004 0.000
Trend 0.010 0.010 0.308
Constant 2.864∗∗∗ 0.354 0.000
Notes: Double and triple asterisks (**, ***) indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 5% and 1%
significance level, respectively.
the observation is found to be further away from the frontier, the minimum possible contraction (θ)
of the new output vector in equation (1) is smaller, and the derivative of the distance function with
respect to inputs is expected to be negative.
The results presented in Table 2 are in accordance to our prior expectations pointed above. The
distance elasticity with respect to other output (log_other) is positive and reflects the share of other
output (meat and crops) in the farms’ total output composition. The low elasticity suggests that the
share of other output on production is rather low. The elasticities of the distance function with respect
to inputs have the expected negative signs and are statistically significant at the 5% significance level.
The high distance elasticities for variable inputs and livestock units in absolute terms reflect the
high cost share of these variables during the study period. The elasticity with respect to N surplus
is negative and statistically significant, which is in accordance with our prior expectations: With
reference to Figure 2, an increase in N surplus implies that the farm will become less efficient as the
observation moves to the right and thus further away from the frontier. Finally, there is evidence that
Dutch dairy farms experience technological progress since the production frontier moves upward
with time.
Turning to the efficiency estimates, the average hyperbolic efficiency is 0.908,12 ranging from a
minimum of 0.374 to a maximum of 0.983. This result implies that farms can, on average, increase
their desirable output production by 10% (1/0.908= 1.10) and, at the same time, reduce their
undesirable output production by 9.2% (1− 0.908= 0.092). Figure 3 presents a histogram of the
hyperbolic efficiency estimates. The histogram of the hyperbolic efficiency estimates exhibits the
typical left-skewed pattern. Most of the farms are highly efficient, while very few of them are
less than 60% efficient. Finally, Table 3 presents the parameter estimates of the determinants of
hyperbolic inefficiency.
12 Robustness checks with respect to the distribution imposed on the inefficiency component reveal that the average of the
efficiency estimates is not sensitive to different distributional assumptions.
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Figure 3. Histogram of Hyperbolic Efficiency Estimates
Table 4. Marginal Effects of the z Variables on Hyperbolic Efficiency
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ASP-decoupled 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
Payments −0.006 0.003 −0.011 −0.001
Intensity 0.093 0.049 0.009 0.181
Milk share 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.006
Trend −0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.000
Except for the dummy variable used to capture the effect of the introduction of ASP and
decoupled payments and the trend variable, all estimates are statistically significant at the 5%
significance level. The parameter estimates presented in Table 3 show the effect of the variables
in z on E(uit). To derive meaningful results with respect to the effect of the variables in z on farms’
hyperbolic efficiency, we derive their marginal effects by calculating the derivative of E (e−uit |εit)
with respect to each variable in z (for details on the calculation of marginal effects in stochastic
frontier models, see Wang, 2002). The marginal effects were calculated at the specific values of the
variables for each observation. Table 4 presents summary statistics of these marginal effects.
The coefficient of the dummy variable that controls for the introduction of ASP and decoupled
payments (ASP-decoupled) is statistically insignificant, as mentioned before. This may occur
because this policy, while reducing farms’ nitrogen surplus, also reduces their desirable output
production. Hence, we do not find differences in farms’ hyperbolic efficiency between the transition
period of MINAS and the combination of ASP and decoupled payments. As mentioned in the
introduction, ASP and decoupled payments lowered farms’ nitrogen surplus (evident in Figure 1) by
setting application standards for nutrients from fertilizers and manure. Meanwhile, such measures
lower the production of desirable output by restricting farms’ technology. Therefore, the overall
effect is insignificant.
The dummy variable capturing potential differences in hyperbolic efficiency between farms that
receive agri-environmental and animal welfare payments (payments) and those that do not has a
negative marginal effect on hyperbolic efficiency. Hence, these payments reduce the production of
desirable output more than they decrease nitrogen surplus. Agri-environmental and animal welfare
payments require farmers to adopt techniques that go beyond the usual good farming practices,
imposing several constraints on the production technology. As previous research has indicated (e.g.,
Zimmermann and Britz (2016)), farms that receive such payments tend to be less productive. This
implies that such farms operate in an area where their desirable output is low, although still close to
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the frontier (average efficiency is 91%). Hence, these farms operate in a region where the curve that
describes the relationship between desirable and undesirable output is rather steep, meaning that a
slight decrease in undesirable output is accompanied by a considerable reduction in desirable output,
resulting in a negative overall effect on the hyperbolic efficiency.
The aforementioned causal interpretation of the effect of agri-environmental and animal welfare
payments on hyperbolic efficiency may be counteracted by endogeneity/self-selection arguments,
which maintain that farmers with low efficiency levels decide to receive these payments because
this is the optimal strategy for them. However, these arguments may not be as strong as they appear,
because this study combines productive and environmental efficiency. In this context, a farm may
be highly inefficient in the hyperbolic measure, even if it is quite efficient when considering only
desirable outputs. It would not make sense for the operator of such a farm to sign up for the payments,
because this would entail a large reduction in desirable outputs in order to conform to the standards.
Conversely, the operator of a farm that is very close to the frontier due to producing relatively
few desirable outputs, but also polluting less, would obviously have an incentive to sign up for the
payments, as these would come at minimal, if any, cost. Therefore, the effect of hyperbolic efficiency
on the probability of receiving payments may be small. In contrast, receiving the payments is
accompanied by production restrictions, which can only shrink the feasible set. Since the efficiency
of farms that receive the payments is measured against a frontier defined by all farms (including those
not subject to restrictions), the efficiency of farms that receive payments will be smaller. Therefore,
the causal effect of payments on hyperbolic efficiency has a theoretical justification and is expected
to be much stronger than the effect that self-selection could have.13
Production intensity positively affects hyperbolic efficiency. As already mentioned,
intensification is characterized by an increasing use of inputs, particularly feed concentrates in the
dairy diet, which results in higher animal productivity and higher desirable output production at the
farm level. However, the intensive character of dairy farms can be detrimental to the environment
because increased feeding results in more nutrients imported into the system (Reinhard, Lovell,
and Thijssen, 2002). However, according to Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijssen (1999), intensive Dutch
dairy farms tend to use less land and buy more feed to increase the productivity of their cows.
Farms buying more feed instead of producing it on the farm tend to import fewer nutrients into the
system than they potentially would have if they had produced the feed on the farm, since roughage
production on the farm requires additional fertilizer use for grassland and, therefore, more nutrients.
Hence, the increase in desirable output production is higher than the increase in nitrogen surplus.
Finally, milk share has a positive effect on hyperbolic efficiency, lending support to a rather
intuitive interpretation. Specialized farms produce more desirable outputs due to their engagement
in a single production activity and the associated advanced technology. In addition, lower fertilizer
use due to less crop production results in lower undesirable outputs, which in turn implies better
joint performance.
Concluding Remarks
Using a hyperbolic distance function and the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach of inefficiency
determinants, we investigated the effects of agri-environmental policies and intensification on the
hyperbolic efficiency of Dutch dairy farms between 2001 and 2010. Our dataset covers a period of
two important policy interventions: the replacement of the Mineral Accounting System (MINAS)
with the combination of the Application Standards Policy (ASP) and decoupled payments, and
the introduction of optional agri-environmental and animal welfare payments. Farms’ hyperbolic
efficiency turns out to be relatively high (91%), indicating that farms do rather well in terms of
their joint performance. Additionally, since some of the policies included in the analysis may not
13 The editor suggested a way to distinguish between the two possible explanations (causality vs. selection), but our data
do not allow us to implement his suggested approach.
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only decrease undesirable outputs but also decrease or increase desirable output production, we were
able to identify whether any of these effects were higher than the other in the case of a joint efficiency
measure.
We find no significant changes in farms’ hyperbolic efficiency during the transition period from
MINAS to the combination of ASP and decoupled payments. The insignificant relationship may
arise because policies intended to reduce farms’ undesirable output production also reduce their
desirable output production. By setting application standards for nutrients, ASP and decoupled
payments reduced surpluses because farmers had an obligation to release fewer nutrients into the
environment; by constraining farms’ technology, their ability to produce desirable outputs (i.e., milk,
meat) was also reduced. This result manifests the value of the employed model as opposed to models
that consider a single efficiency measure. For instance, if one computed a single environmental
efficiency measure (such as that of Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijssen, 1999, 2002), and given the
decrease in nitrogen surplus, which is evident from Figure 1, a researcher would conclude that
environmental efficiency increased after the introduction of ASP in combination with decoupled
payments. Despite this result being true, standing on its own would hide important information
concerning the simultaneous changes in the desirable outputs revealed by the current study.
We find that the agri-environmental and animal welfare payments had significant effects on
hyperbolic efficiency. Farms receiving these payments are less hyperbolically efficient than those
which do not, suggesting that the reduction in desirable output production is higher than the
reduction in undesirable production. As mentioned in the introduction, farmers who receive these
payments are required to adopt stricter environmentally friendly practices than the ones that ASP
involves. However, such practices turn out to decrease farms’ overall efficiency by imposing
significant constraints on farms’ technology. This result has useful policy implications. If reduction
in undesirable outputs becomes more important, policies that aim to decrease it need to be designed
such that the potential loss of desirable outputs is compensated. When a society has many policy
measures, it is important to understand that different policies may offset each others’ objectives. For
future policy design, it is crucial to assess the overall effects of the different but related policies.
Intensification of feed per cow improves farms’ joint performance. This result reveals that the
increase in farms’ desirable outputs as a result of employing intensive production techniques is
greater than the increase in undesirable outputs attributed to the lower nutrient content of the
purchased feed compared to on-farm roughage production. The finding of a positive effect of
intensification of the use of feed per cow on the joint performance of dairy farms highlights that
knowledge of the nutrient concentration of feedstuffs and nutrient requirements of the animals can
provide the basis for more efficient feeding methods in order to prevent excretion of nutrients to
manure. Thus, the development of programs focused on education of producers concerning dairy
nutrition through farm visits, seminars, and newsletters can ensure that increased production can be
achieved with minimal detrimental effects on the environment.
Finally, specialization in milk production increases farms’ joint performance because specialized
farmers not only produce higher levels of desirable outputs because they are more experienced
in a single production activity but also produce fewer undesirable outputs because they use
smaller amounts of inputs with high nutrient-leaching potential for crop cultivation purposes. Even
though diversification of production is typically risk-reducing, this result suggests that any policy
encouraging specialization in a single production activity should contribute to the sustainability of
the production process.
[Received March 2017; final revision received September 2018.]
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Appendix
Table A1. Estimates of the Model’s Parameters
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. p-Value
log_other 0.027 0.009 0.004
log_K −0.023 0.008 0.002
log_L −0.023 0.011 0.032
log_A −0.078 0.013 0.000
log_I −0.379 0.018 0.000
log_S −0.385 0.021 0.000
log_N −0.069 0.007 0.000
trend −0.019 0.002 0.000
log_KK −0.003 0.006 0.546
log_KL 0.028 0.019 0.140
log_KA 0.055 0.022 0.011
log_KI −0.004 0.021 0.852
log_KS −0.140 0.027 0.000
log_LL 0.079 0.022 0.000
log_LA −0.086 0.044 0.047
log_LI 0.128 0.042 0.003
log_LS −0.247 0.059 0.000
log_AA 0.084 0.027 0.002
log_AI −0.004 0.049 0.940
log_AS −0.035 0.069 0.610
log_II −0.001 0.031 0.987
log_IS −0.059 0.076 0.444
log_SS 0.196 0.065 0.002
log_NN −0.008 0.001 0.000
log_other2 0.010 0.002 0.000
log_KN 0.015 0.006 0.008
log_LN 0.052 0.012 0.000
log_AN −0.028 0.013 0.036
log_IN −0.019 0.010 0.050
log_SN 0.031 0.019 0.102
log_K_other −0.007 0.008 0.399
log_L_other 0.014 0.017 0.403
log_A_other −0.011 0.017 0.545
log_I_other 0.132 0.018 0.000
log_S_other −0.120 0.022 0.000
log_N_other −0.011 0.005 0.024
trend2 0.002 0.000 0.000
trend_log_K 0.002 0.002 0.151
trend_log_L −0.016 0.004 0.000
trend_log_A 0.002 0.004 0.591
trend_log_I 0.017 0.004 0.000
trend_log_S −0.019 0.006 0.001
trend_log_N 0.001 0.001 0.410
trend_log_other −0.001 0.002 0.727
Constant −0.132 0.009 0.000
Continued on next page. . .
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Table A1. – continued from previous page
mu Coeff. Std. Err. p-Value
ASP-decoupled −0.011 0.039 0.779
Payments 0.055 0.024 0.020
Intensity −0.875 0.234 0.000
Milk share −0.031 0.004 0.000
Trend 0.010 0.010 0.308
Constant 2.864 0.354 0.000
σ2 0.035 0.006
γ 0.733 0.054
σ2u 0.026 0.006
σ2v 0.009 0.001
Notes: mu denotes the specification of the location parameter of the inefficiency term, uit , σ 2 the variance of the composite error term, γ the
ratio of the variance of the inefficiency component to the variance of the composite error term ( σ
2
u
σ2
), σ 2u the variance of the inefficiency
component, and σ 2v the variance of the error term that captures statistical noise.
